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------------------------
This paper aims at exploring how intentional a piece of behavior should be to count 
as an action, and how a minimal view on action, not requiring a richly intentional 
causation, may still qualify as voluntary.
Knowing what counts as an action is not only a matter of nominal definition. It has 
important consequences in education, law, as well as in ethics. One unresolved 
question in the domain of action consists in  determining  which features, if any, are 
distinctive of human action as contrasted with non-human animal action. The interest of 
studying what Kent Bach (1978) called "minimal actions" is that they seem not to 
presuppose any prior intention, not even any conscious decision. Defining a minimal 
action as a guided bodily movement (not requiring an intentional - belief-desire - 
causation) will help us discuss some issues that become easily blurred within the folk-
psychological approach to full-fledged, richly intentional actions. In the first section, I 
will first develop the contrast between the two kinds of action and offer reasons for 
taking the category of minimal action as a functionally relevant one. In the second 
section, this "austere" definition of action will be used  to test our intuitions about what 
counts as a voluntary action. In ordinary usage, three different ways of explaining what 
makes an action voluntary can be found. The first involves the sense of agency which 
normally, but not necessarily, accompanies self-generated bodily movement. The 
second invokes the fact that the subject wanted to act as she did. The third, richer 
meaning of a voluntary action requires that an agent has a positive evaluation of what 
she did, in the sense that her second-order desires are in agreement with the action 
taken. We will examine how these three senses may apply to minimal actions. This 
analysis will hopefully contribute separating out causal, experiential and metaphysical 
considerations on voluntary action.
I - Full-blooded versus Minimal Actions
Standard philosophical approaches of action define it in terms of some psychological 
state causing a  relevant bodily movement. While there is now a wide convergence on 
this causal approach of action, there are disagreements on the kind of psychological 
state deemed relevant for action.  Davidson (1980) holds that what is causal is a 
reason to act, ie   a "proattitude" (desire) relative to some state of affairs, in combination 
with the relevant belief that such and such a movement would bring about the desired 
condition. Goldman (1970)  maintains similarly that the psychological states causing 
behavior are wants and beliefs. Searle (1983), Bratman (1987) and Mele (1992)  claim 
that intentions form an indispensible link between reasons and actions. Intentions have 
two essential features : they guide behavior in virtue of their representational content; 
they move an agent to act in virtue of their executive properties.
What is important to note is that, in these various causal theories, an agent is not 
directly a cause of her actions; her  beliefs, motivational or intentional states are. Also, 
these theories embed action in a practical reasoning schema  : an agent has to judge 
that he desires P and that he believes Q in order to conclude that the action A 
recommends itself; she also has to assess the relative strength of her various 
competing reasons for  performing an action of type A rather than of type B. In this way, 
the causes of an action coincide with the reasons  the agent has for acting.
Thus the reason to act, in these standard theories, is both a justification of an action, 
and a cause  of the corresponding physical behavior. In the intentional account, for 
example, a subject acts because she formed and was able to self-ascribe the 
corresponding intention. Forming an intention of a certain type and  self-ascribing the 
corresponding intention further require from the subject an ability to use the relevant 
concepts  in formulating her intentions, in appreciating her preferences and in 
performing her practical reasoning. Many authors would also defend the view that an 
agent must have a concept of self to recognize the corresponding intentions as her 
own and take responsibility for the developing action. In this account of action, mental 
events and properties endowed with conceptual content  play an overwhelming role in 
the very causation of an action. 
Starting with this received view on action, there are two ways of relaxing the 
conditions for a particular behavior to qualify as an action. The first consists in 
disconnecting the causation of action from the appreciation of the reasons that justify 
the actions ; the second consists in questioning the importance of having a specific 
intention for an action to be triggered. Let us examine first why the definition of an 
action needs to be extended in these two respects.
A - Ability in justifying action as a precondition for acting
While it makes sense, biologically, that an organism should use all the knowledge 
available to it to control adequately its behavior, it is not clear that the elements  of 
conceptual knowledge offered in rationalizing behavior should also be a necessary 
precondition for triggering an intention and the corresponding action. In other words, it 
seems plausible to allow a disconnection between performing an action of type A in 
context C, on the one hand, and rationalizing this performance, on the other hand. 
This disconnection may be either radical or graded. In the radical approach, a non-
linguistic animal would be attributed agency capacities just in case it performs some 
goal-directed behavior based on its prior encounters with similar situations. Such an 
organism may  be said to act  if it behaves on the basis of prior learning of what is to be 
done in context C (C includes endogeneous motivational states and exogeneous 
affordances), whether or not it engages in  practical reasoning. Learning triggers the 
behavior in the sense that an organism exposed to motivating cues in a given context 
is disposed to perform an action of type A. Nevertheless learning is nothing else than a 
set of representations being activated in the control of behavior ; by using the internal 
indicators whose function is to signal meaningful events and properties (presence of a 
predator, of food, of a mate), the agent  - human or non-human - can develop the 
adequate motor response. In this radical version of the cause/reason disconnection, an 
action may well develop without the agent consciously representing the situation in a 
space of reasons. Indeed learning can develop outside any conscious access to 
reasons for acting in this particular way.
The graded approach would simply admit the possibility of a loose connection 
between acting and rationalizing action. In this view, learning  is a case in which 
reasons for acting might still be offered, although not necessarily by the agent himself. 
An observer would be allowed to substitute to the agent to explain in which way the 
chosen course of action conforms to the agent's best interests, given its other epistemic 
and motivational states. A reason to favour the graded approach has to do with the fact 
that reinforcement learning, in a way, instantiates a piece of practical reasoning. 
Reinforcement learning could be expressed through the following sequence of 
representations. Given that certain internal representations have been activated ("this 
is a predator"), given the established associative links between these representations 
and highly significant properties ("danger for self and for offspring"), the conclusion 
reached  is that "flight (or protective attack) should be preferred". But the difference 
between this kind of embodied reasoning and full-blown practical reasoning is that 
reinforcement does not rely on a general and detached analysis of the facts at hand, as 
does practical reasoning. It does not need to explore counterfactual events and 
properties -- those which would not be present  if the action was not to take place. 
Although reinforcement learning can be evaluated as a rational way of coping with a 
stable world, it cannot be equated with a form of practical reasoning because no 
representation of the alternative courses is needed in the former, while it is essential to 
the latter.
 If the analysis above is on the right track, the very notion that a causal account of 
action should coincide with a justification in terms of reasons to act dissolves. A non 
speaking animal or a young child  cannot provide a justification for their actions, and 
cannot even represent to themselves the problem of justifying them. Not only because 
they cannot explain what they did to others or to themselves, cannot select the 
appropriate concepts while communicating the content of their intentions and therefore 
have no business with rationalizing what they did. But also because a non-speaking 
animal or a young child cannot represent counterfactual situations, i.e. alternative 
courses of action available in the same context, with their consequences and their 
relative motivational strengths. This suggests that the radical view of the disconnection 
between action and reason-giving is more accurate than the graded view in the case of 
actions performed by non-speaking animals.
What holds for all kinds of animal or infant actions also holds for an extended set of 
human adult actions. There are many cases in which an agent has no interest in 
developing practical reasoning in its full-fledged form. The agent simply acts 
unreflexively, and not on the basis of a former representation, however sketchy,  of the 
means-end relation at hand, and of her reasons to perform the corresponding action at 
the light of her best knowledge.
B - Intention as a precondition for acting
Another way of weakening the standard account of an action consists in questioning 
the essential role of intentions in initiating an action. Kent Bach boldly claimed that the 
supposition that every action should be taken as intentional  - or at least, when 
unsuccessful, to involve an intentional part -, is "unsupported" (Bach, 1978, 363). By an 
intention, Bach understands a distinctive conscious piece of willing, a mental event that 
could be self-presented by the agent through the words "I will do A". Bach observes 
correctly that there are types of actions which are performed routinely and unthinkingly, 
actions for which it cannot be claimed that they were willed in the sense in which one 
willingly writes a letter or utters a sentence. Examples of these "minimal" actions are all 
kinds of  postural or preattentive movements, such as scratching an itch, doodling, 
brushing a fly, avoiding an object (Bach, 1978), shifting a gear, pacing about the room, 
(Searle, 1983), impulsive or expressive actions such as tearing a photo into pieces out 
of rage, jumping up out of joy  (Hursthouse, 1991).
Bach (1978) offers two main reasons for admitting non intentional kinds of actions. 
First, it seems difficult to reject from actions all the types of behavior cited above. They 
might well  be the only kind of actions which infants, patients with executive disorders 
and "animals on the middle rungs of the phylogenetic ladder" are able to perform. 
Second, there is more to an action than its initiation. The way in which an action is 
carried out seems not to be determined at the level of a prior intention. Although the 
specific way in which an action is performed requires a form of awareness, the latter 
seems "below the level of intentions and reasons".  The level of acting  which is left 
when (conscious or unconscious) prior intentions are missing  corresponds to what 
Bach calls a "minimal" action. 
One might want to say  that John Searle's analysis in his (1983) essay gives an 
adequate answer to Kent Bach's challenge. First, Searle acknowledges the existence 
of actions performed  without   prior intentions. In contrast with the situation where an 
agent forms a priori  the intention to do A -  an intention reportable by the linguistic form 
"I will do A" -, Searle claims that one often performs an action with no such prior 
intention, but rather with an occurrent thought of the linguistic form "I  do A". When I 
scratch my back, I don't form the prior intention to the effect that I will scratch my back, I 
just do it (1983, 84). But there is no reason, according to Searle, to conclude that I do it 
so to speak unintentionally. This kind of mental state belongs to intentions, because it 
is constituted - and this is a central point -  by the conscious experience of acting. 
According to Searle, it is "inseparable from action", and called for that very reason "an 
intention in action". (1983, 84) 
Second, intentions in action have another feature which meets Bach's objection, that 
an intention should not only trigger an action, but control its development. When an 
agent has the intention to drive to her office, she does not form explicitly the prior 
intention to shift gears  from second to third ; she does so as a result of her intention in 
action to shift gears from second to third. Such an intention in action has the function of 
specifying the details of how an intentional content - the goal of the corresponding 
action -  should be realized. A further question here is to explain how this realization of 
a conceptual intentional content into a non-conceptual concrete behavior can be made 
possible. According to Searle, the explanation consists in embedding a second causal 
link in the intentional chain. The prior intention specifies the goal in conceptual terms ; 
the intention in action consists in an  "experience of acting" which  causes the  specific 
bodily movements associated to it. In Searle's view, an experience of acting is a 
"presentation of its conditions of satisfaction" (Searle, 1983, 88). This ensures that the 
representational character of the experience will be tightly linked to its distinctive 
"feeling" : being a presentation  involves having a specific phenomenological 
character, an associated feeling of agency ; having conditions of satisfaction  make it a 
fully intentional state, i.e. a state whose function is determined by a relationship 
between a mental representation and an external state of affairs.
Searle's notion of an intention in action certainly responds in part to Bach's problem. 
Indeed, it does account for the two essential constraints which make an action minimal. 
An intention in action has to do with the routine, unplanned ways of coping with the 
environment, whether physical or social ; it also accounts for the specific dynamics of 
the bodily movements through which an action is being performed. 
Still there are features in Searle's analysis which conflict with the demands of 
minimal actions. First, the direction of causation   of an intentional action is taken by 
Searle to be, in all cases, "mind to world"( Searle, 1983, 88) : an intention in action is a 
mental experience of trying which causes the bodily movement fitting that very 
intention, i.e. a bodily movement whose adequacy is an objective fact out in the world. 
In this analysis, an action whose direction of causation is world to world is a conceptual 
impossibility. Such a world to world direction of causation seems however involved 
each time an organism simply does what the context prompts him/her to do, i.e. each 
time a piece of goal-directed behavior is stimulus-driven. When for example a patient 
with an imitation syndrom  is performing an action when she sees the same action 
performed by another agent, she is displaying an intentional behavior based, 
presumably, on the formation of intentions in action ; but the causation of her action is 
not mind to world for that. The world causes her to act, and she might be in a position to 
complain that people use her neurological problem to make her do things which she 
does not approve. A similar situation occurs in many cases in which normal agents are 
influenced to act as they do by contingent events in their environment : babies starting 
to cry when another baby cries, crowds of people running in panic to the same exit 
door, any one of us  responding to a hand-shake approach by a hand-extension, etc. A 
last important set of less-than-intentional cases consists in what might be called 
deferred quasi-intentional behavior : an agent forms a plan, then forgets subsequently 
that he did, but nevertheless acts accordingly without a conscious  intention in action 
when the context cues him for doing so. (See Wegner, Reader, vol. 2, 22 sq). To this 
category probably belongs the case of the post-hypnotic agent executing an action she 
does not remember having been instructed to perform.
What seems to make these cases difficult for Searle is 1) that his concept of an 
intention in action is taylored to be autonomously causative in action, that  2) that it 
essentially belongs to the family of conscious states and finally that 3) causation is 
effected through the very experience that the corresponding intention in action 
provides. What happens  then when an action is performed without  a conscious 
experience of doing so, for example in driving absent-mindedly ? Searle admits that, 
"in such a case the intention in action exists without any experience of acting. The only 
difference then between them [ = between this case and the case in which the action is 
conscious] is that the experience may have certain phenomenal properties that are not 
essential to the intention" (92). 
In arguing in this way, Searle aims  explicitly at finding a theoretical status for non 
conscious intention in action symmetrical to  the case of non conscious perception in 
blindsight. A patient with blindsight has no  phenomenal experience of seeing that P, 
but can still extract from vision at least some of its intentional properties. Similarly, a 
distracted person may have no phenomenal experience that he is driving, but rather 
have a non congruent experience (listening to his car radio, thinking about the 
elections, etc.) ; he may still accomplish the bodily movements which are part of the 
intentional conditions of satisfaction for driving.
This symmetry between perception and action is more apparent than real, however, 
and in particular it is easy to see that the parallel  with blindsight does not work. For 
while a visual content can survive the absence of a visual experience, because the 
external object is what makes the extraction of a specific intentional content possible to 
begin with (Searle, 1983, 47),  it does not seem open to us to say, at least within 
Searle's theory, that the experience of an action can go on causing the corresponding 
action when it has no phenomenological property. For in that case, there is no 
independent event - at least no event which Searle would be happy to consider - 
causing both the subjective experience and the bodily movement as is the case in 
perception (where one can be informationally connected with an object  without 
recognizing it).  Given that an intention in action is essentially conscious, and is 
supposed to operate through the image of the action it provides, the notion of an 
unconscious intention in action remains rather obscure, and does not allow to 
understand how it might cause the action as if it had been conscious all along.  
 A more intelligible theory of the mental cause of an action would follow a functional 
rather than an experiential lead.  There is indeed a mental process causing the action, 
on which the conscious experience of acting partly supervenes : it consists in activating 
a specific motor representation. Such a notion has all the features which make the 
concept of intention in action attractive, without excluding the possibility of minimal 
actions. Being both executive in its function and specific in its content, an active motor 
representation explains how an agent can execute in a concrete and flexible way a 
general plan ; it accounts for the adjustments that the agent has to make to reach the 
target state (by comparing dynamically the observed result with the anticipated goal). 
This solution further allows that a representation can be activated without being 
conscious or susceptible of becoming conscious.  Final important merit : the activation 
of a motor representation does not presuppose that the source of the representational 
activation be endogeneous, i.e. constituted by some particular intention to act. In this 
general scheme, an action should not be defined  in terms of its source, but in terms of 
its specific development from an internal model towards a goal with an appropriately 
monitored execution. What is   pertinent  is  whether or not the bodily movements tend 
to be under the agent's guidance" : whatever the causal antecedents of a specific goal-
directed movement may be, what makes it an action is the contribution of the 
corresponding agent to actively maintain the orientation of his bodily effort towards 
achieving a target event. In the case of minimal actions, the source of the action, i.e. the 
actual cause that triggers it, may be exogeneous (a motivating  or "prepotent" stimulus) 
as well as endogeneous  (a forgotten instance of planning, an overlearned routine). In 
this theory, minimal actions become the far end of a wide spectrum of behaviors ; the 
way in which an action is carried out may vary from a purely automatic, non-conscious 
process  to a controlled and deliberate monitoring. 
 It is to the credit of Kent Bach to have  sketched such a theory - which he calls 
Representational Causalism - well before neurophysiological findings could give this 
theory its empirical credentials (See Jeannerod, 1994, for a review). The central claim 
of Representational Causalism is that all actions  - including minimal ones - "require 
"effective" representations for their initiation and execution" (Bach, 1978, 367). In this 
view, the representational character of the motor instructions allow the guidance to 
develop over time towards the goal. In other terms, acting presupposes essentially the 
ability to compare the representation of what is to be done with the various feedback 
representations conveyed by the agent's senses (what Bach calls "receptive 
representations"). Effective representations provide the motor commands, whereas the 
receptive representations correspond to the reafferences used as feedback for 
corrections or termination of the process. The set of effective and receptive 
representations,  considered independently from their  mind to world or world to mind 
"direction of fit", is aptly referred to as executive representations.  Although Bach does 
not call his executive representations "motor representations", he insists that they are 
not propositional in form, and not necessarily linguistically coded ; nor do they 
necessarily imply any intentions or beliefs (1978, 366). Let us mention two other 
features that would deserve more attention, but can only be mentioned in the present 
article. Such a set  of representations is stored in memory, and thus allows    recall, 
mental simulation, as well as active role in executive feedforward and feedback. This 
choice of dispositional aspects of motor representations accounts for the role of 
imagery in simulation and in preparation of action, and for the fact that imagery, while 
useful, may also be entirely absent from performance. Furthermore, such 
representations may be activated in the absence of  any conscious control or self-
attribution, while again taking part in these processes when certain additional 
conditions are present.
Revising the constituents of a minimal action
 As John Searle insists, "The key of Intentionality is conditions of satisfaction. It ought 
to be a rule in all of these discussions that nobody is allowed to talk about an 
intentional phenomenon without telling us what its conditions of satisfaction are" (1991, 
297). Now that we have shown that an action may develop without relying on prior 
pragmatic reasoning, or even on a conscious intention, it is time to make   the 
conditions of satisfaction of a minimal action explicit.
As we saw, the causation may be world to world as well as mind to world ; therefore 
the causal origin  of the activation of a specific motor representation should not be part 
of the definition of a minimal action. A  successful minimal physical action is such that a 
given motor representation takes control of behavior and monitors adequately 
occurrent feedback until its target event is reached. As in the kind of analysis offered by 
Searle, this persistent role of the representation in the action, from triggering until 
completion, can be expressed as a kind of self-reference of the motor representation in 
the intentional content ; the latter can be articulated as : 
that  this very representation cause the appropriate bodily movement. 
The "appropriateness" here is normally the result of prior learning, or alternatively, of 
hardwired responses to context, such as  a flight induced by spotting a predator. 
Adequate monitoring is such that it makes gradually possible a transformation of the 
world in  some expected condition through an appropriate sequence of active bodily 
movements. Inadequate monitoring would defeat the minimal action just as it defeats a 
full-fledged one. For example, if a minimal action consists in pacing about, tripping on 
the carpet or stepping on a brittle item would present a failure of the relevant motor 
representation in monitoring the input-output flow of information; new energy-
consuming steps would have to be taken. If by scratching an itch, an extension of the 
itch or an open wound follows, these unfelicitous and unexpected consequences lead 
the agent to cope with a new situation.  So minimal actions also have conditions of 
satisfaction ; failing to achieve the latter, or achieving them improperly,  may interfere 
with other plans of the same agent. 
Whereas a typical failure in full-fledged action consists in missing crucial steps or 
mistaking the target for another, it is less typical in the case of minimal actions, because 
they normally involve elementary bodily movements : launching one single automatic 
process, like walking or scratching, does not seem to lend itself to disruptive 
interferences, because being more automatic than the rest of the actions, it is likely to 
be successfully absorbed in the course of the other actions being launched in parallel. 
(One can scratch an itch, for example, while answering the phone). It may nevertheless 
sometimes happen that a minimal action never reaches its goal, maybe for lack of any 
adequate motor representation (e.g. scraching a part of the back where one cannot 
reach), for lack of time or for lack of other external conditions of satisfaction.  Other 
ways in which a minimal action can fail to succeed is to fail to come to a stop by failing 
to register that its target event has been reached. This is the case of compulsive 
scratching or washing, for example, which can be analysed as cases of perseveration.
Let us take stock. What distinguishes executive representations  from intentions as 
used in the standard causal theory is 1) that they are not necessarily  conscious and 2) 
that they nevertheless actually guide the course of an action. The kind of relation they 
have to action, in other words, is functional rather than experiential. But all these 
welcome consequences are associated to a less than welcome one : there is now a 
gap to be bridged between conscious access to intention and action, on the one hand, 
and the actual representational causation of the action, on the other hand. There is 
morevoer no guarantee that bridging this gap will leave our sense of agency 
unscathed. To understand why, we have to understand how representations become 
effective, i.e. causally efficacious in causing a bodily movement. We will ask this 
question in the context of a more general question, having to do with the ways in which 
it is justified - or only tempting, but wrong - to say that a minimal action is voluntary.
II - How voluntary are minimal actions ? 
There are three senses at least in which an action is ordinarily called voluntary. The 
first has to do with the feeling of will  associated with the action ; the second has to do 
with the causal origin of the action : an action is called voluntary in the latter  sense if its 
cause is endogeneous and can be consciously accessed; the third sense involves 
higher-order states  of the agent relative to the first-order intentional content of the 
action. Let us examine in turn each notion of will involved, in order to evaluate how 
voluntary minimal actions can be.
A - Voluntariness as a feeling of willful action
Intuitively, speaking of a voluntary action suggests a specific feeling of being in 
charge, in contrast with cases when a move is triggered by physical forces or social 
constraints. In the case of minimal actions, an agent may  also have a feeling of being 
in charge, even though she did not deliberate on his doing what she does. She has the 
sense of  doing  X voluntarily (jumping up from joy, scratching her arm, etc.).  How is 
she aware of this specific quality of her behavior ? A natural response would be to say 
that an agent gains this awareness on the basis of the specific motor representation 
presently activated.  In this view, the motor representation would carry its own 
representational status on its sleeve, so to speak. If a representation adequately 
monitors current behavior, it would  "tell" the subject what  she does while she does it. 
Even in the specific case of minimal actions, where no prior intention is involved, an 
agent could recognize that she acts because whatever she does is guided by 
corresponding motor representations. 
There are several reasons, however, to reject the general view that conscious 
awareness of agency is a byproduct of activating executive representations.  First, 
neurological dissociations have been documented between awareness of having 
performed a movement and awareness of [thereby] performing a specific action. 
Clinical data from apraxia and from schizophrenia, as well as experimental results on 
normal subjects,  suggest that a subject may know which action she is performing while 
being wrong about the way she is performing it, and vice versa : knowing which 
movement she executes, while being unaware of, or confabulating, the intentional 
motive of the movement. In other words, she may be able to characterize her goal and 
unable to report on the way she has acted towards it; reciprocally, she may be able to 
copy a particular gesture without being able to extract from it an information on the goal 
which this gesture normally subserves. In echopraxias, patients may also invent a goal 
for what seems to be a pure case of stimulus driven behavior. More surprisingly yet, an 
agent may identify an action through its goal and through the specific movement token 
which is used to reach it, without being able to identify correctly the author of this 
action. 
What is largely documented in neuropsychological patients is also true for normal 
people in specific contexts. As every gym teacher knows, normal untrained children 
and adults are rather poor at  reproducing accurately a specific token of a movement. 
Although they can describe exactly what they see being done, they seem to have 
trouble identifying the way in which they themselves are moving, in particular in the 
absence of a target object. In an experiment  by  Fourneret & Jeannerod (1998), normal 
subjects are asked to draw a saggital line on a horizontal plane with a stylus, which 
they are not allowed to  see directly. What they see is an image of their line-drawing on 
a monitor screen. Unknown to the subjects, the visual image is occasionally biased in 
deviating more or less from the line they actually produce; the subjects  need to 
deviate their own movement in the opposite direction for achieving a saggital line on 
the monitor. When asked to reproduce their drawing with eyes closed, right after each 
trial,  the subjects tend to draw a line  straight ahead, as suggested by the former visual 
reafference, in contradiction to any endogeneous source of  information they might 
have had during their action. 
These data on action awareness might be extended to the case of minimal actions, 
and  suggest  that in this case too, the perceptual experience  of  the action-related 
situation does not directly draw on the motor representation controlling the 
corresponding behavior. So it may be asked again : on the basis of what kind of 
information is a subject  aware of her minimal actions as her own ? 
Normally, any mental or physical activity is perceived as originating in self or in some 
external event thanks to the information carried by a dedicated signal, telling whether a 
movement was effected by the individual ; when absent, the brain would "interpret" a 
movement as unwilled, as when the body  is passively subjected to some external 
force.  The relevant signal is supposed to help compare reafferent signals with the 
signals that are expected on the basis of the current willed movement. It has been 
suggested that such a signal would be delivered by a mechanism underlying  active 
perceptual activitities, named corollary discharge, (Sperry, 1950) or efferent copy (von 
Holst & Mittelstaedt, 1950). This mechanism is required to explain, for example, how 
ocular saccades can be taken into account and neutralized in interpreting visual input. 
When no such efferent copy signal is produced (one is sitting in a train), it is much more 
difficult to say whether oneself is moving or whether the perceived scene is. In our 
conscious sense of agency, a major component would thus consist in the sense of 
effort which is the subjective correlate of the corollary discharge of any action. 
This sense of effort would account for the general feeling of having executed 
voluntarily an action, and would be lacking when a bodily movement happens 
involuntarily (by way of some external force, as when you're pushed by someone). An 
activation of this signal might certainly tell the agent, generally speaking, whether he is 
moving in a voluntary way. Yet  this does not explain how the agent could become 
aware that he did such and such a specific  type of movement or action.
The answer to this question might be related to the kind of  expectations that are 
prompted to an agent when her behavior is controlled by a given motor representation. 
A subject might use the subpersonal information concerning the present input 
sequence as being actively gained  and the feedback expectancies associated to a 
given motor representation (also activated at a subpersonal level). She would thus be 
able to perceive the intentional content of her action through the kind of visual 
feedback and end result which she is able (when her action is successful) to anticipate 
and experience sequentially in the visual, proprioceptive or auditory modes.  In this 
view, a subject is able to perceive her own actions  by looking directly at the dynamic 
visual, auditory, properties of the world. Perceiving an action would thus crucially 
depend on the very existence of a distinctive sequence of perceptual feedback, in 
particular of a visual nature. When this feedback is ambiguous or  distorted, then the 
sense of what is done would be distorted accordingly.
Such a claim seems largely consonant with Daniel Wegner's view, according to which 
"we would tend to see ourselves as the authors of an act primarily when we had 
experienced relevant thoughts about the act at an appropriate interval in advance, and 
so could infer that our own mental processes had set the act in motion".  The two 
approaches  only seem to diverge on the inferential nature of the whole process. In the 
present view, while perceiving her own actions, an agent perceives a sequence of 
objects and properties in her environment and the transformations contingent to her 
bodily movements. This kind of perception is  of a sensory kind ; it may give rise to a 
perceptual judgment as to the kind of action currently being performed, well before the 
action is completed. The action may be recognized perceptually through very tenuous 
cues without having to be inferred (no less than seeing a part of the Eiffel Tower leads 
one to inferring the presence of the Eiffel Tower ; the Eiffel Tower is perceived, and not 
inferred). 
The fact that a subject can read off  her own acting  from her perceptual reafferences 
does not imply, however, that her perception is reliable   in all circumstances : both 
approaches - Wegner's and the present one - converge again on this point. If the 
reafferences are either entirely unexpected by the agent - for lack of a prior experience 
or because the environment is very different from the ordinary, the subject may fail to 
perceive the action as her own (just as any pattern - visual, auditory, etc. - cannot be 
extracted if there is too much "noise"). 
If, on the other hand, as is the case with minimal actions, the reafferences are 
processed in an automatic way, with a diminished awareness, the sense of the action 
being voluntary should also be diminished. There might be numerous cases in which a 
subject admits that she executed an action "without realizing it", and pleads for 
distraction, or even denies having performed the action (as in many delusional states). 
Our definition nevertheless implies that if she exerted a control in performance, then 
she did perform the action.
One can object to this definition of a voluntary action through perceptual access, 
however, by claiming that it only emphasizes what is crucial for voluntary movement, 
while being silent about voluntary action. A subject can certainly see  that she herself 
moved ; but finding out that she herself acted   is more complicated, and calls for a 
second type of analysis.
B - Voluntariness as an endogeneous causal feature
At least in one sense of action, there is more to voluntary action than there is to 
voluntary movement. An action being voluntary has to be constrasted with a movement 
being voluntary.  I may have moved to the window because I wanted to see whether my 
friend had arrived,  because I was influenced by a previous hypnosis session, 
because I was ordered to, or because I was attracted by light. There is nothing in the 
signals explored above (efference copy, perceptual reafferences) that can tell the 
agent whether he has done the action deliberately or not, through his own choice or 
under the influence of external cues. The  signals in question have the function of 
helping an agent recognise whether he did move or whether the environment changed 
independently, but they don't help him recognize whether he has been made to move 
at a "deeper" causal level. The second sense in which an action is voluntary consists in 
attributing to the agent's mental states an  active,  versus an instrumental  role, in 
initiating the action.
 By an active role, is meant that the event that caused the bodily movement is some 
set of conscious beliefs or of motivations  (it should be kept in mind, however, that most 
internal states and events, such as storing information, or producing an emotional 
response, are not  themselves  voluntary processes). This is the kind of account of 
action favored by folk psychology, and it is to it (in this sense) that the word voluntary 
usually applies. In the terms of Wolfgang Prinz (1997) summarizing critically this 
standard view, "Voluntary actions appear in the world because actors have a certain 
goal  that they want  to attain, and because they believe that this goal can be attained 
with the help of a certain action". (1997, 157). 
 By an instrumental role, is meant that the relevant causal event for triggering the 
bodily movement in the agent is some subpersonal mechanism harnessed to a 
particular property in the environment, making the agent directly susceptible to be set 
to act  by that property. For example, an agent sees an object of interest, which triggers 
an arm extension for taking hold of this object. Similarly, a red traffic light  automatically 
leads the driver to apply the brake.
This sense of a voluntary action allows specifiying our question : are minimal actions 
voluntary in this  B-sense ? Given that, as we saw, they are by definition not caused by 
an intention with a specific content, but rather by specific cues in a given context, they 
obviously fail to be voluntary in sense B. Although they feel like something done by the 
self, in sense A of a voluntary movement, they are not caused by any particular 
occurrent, conscious mental state.  There is nothing in the awareness which a subject 
gains of his own "minimal" action which allows him to realize that "he was not in 
charge". No particular feature in the subject's experience can inform him whether he 
himself did what he did, or whether he was instead moved to do it by some 
subpersonal mechanism resonating to some feature out in the world. It is all the more 
striking that the absence of any distinctive phenomenological property for "active" 
versus "instrumental" agency does not leave, so to speak, a  gap   in the subject's 
experience. Each time he moves voluntarily, the agent seems disposed to believe that 
he thereby acts  voluntarily. Agents engaging in minimal actions, as Wolfgang Prinz 
observes  " do not do what they want, but they want what they do" (Prinz 1997b, 155, cf. 
Reader vol. II).
Most authors agree that the causation of an action is not located at the agent's level, 
but at the level of motivational and epistemic states. A bolder claim, defended among 
others by Prinz (Reader, vol. II) and Proust (1996), takes the agent considered as a 
person as a late - and maybe optional - construct in human development, with no 
primary causal role in action, minimal or full-fledged. In contrast, the very belief  that 
one is a person carries a lot of causal potential. People learn first how to act, then strive 
for being identified and recognized over time by their group fellows  as temporally 
extended responsible persons. This strife leads them to performing actions they would 
not have been motivated to do otherwise.
This analysis of persons in terms of beliefs should not lead us however to the view 
that an individual human being has no internal states, no goals and no desires of his 
own. Indeed in a system with no such states, no construction of selves could ever 
occur. What we should rather say is that the motivational and epistemic states have a 
causal power by themselves, independently of the particular belief in an overwhelming 
entity or person who would "own" these states and, so to speak,  pilot herself with one 
part of herself.
The reasons why it would be mistaken to claim that all human actions are minimal is 
that,  once we acknowledge that stored information does shape current behavior, then 
the capacity of mental states to jointly cause an action has to be admitted. Of course, 
the stored information has not been generated by the agent. The context contained the 
relevant kind of information which the system was able to extract, categorize and store. 
Desires were largely generated as a consequence of social interactions and 
phylogenetic programming. They did not arise as a consequence of purely 
endogeneous events. This granted, a distinction should be made between those 
episodes where an action is carefully thought over and planned, and those where an 
agent acts with no conscious, verbally expressible motive. Even if we question the 
ontological significance of persons in causation of actions, it seems implausible to 
jump to the claim that all kinds of action are  "arational".
We saw above that discovering whether oneself moved, or  whether the perceived 
environment moved, is a matter of perception. Considering now the sense B of a 
voluntary action,  one might agree that knowing whether one acted voluntarily is a 
matter of inference; as emphasized by  D. Wegner,   the agent  relies on the 
phenomenology of active movement to infer   that he is  also the conscious causal 
source of his own acts.  As the well-known experiments of Nisbett and Wilson (1977) 
have shown, subjects tend to explain retrospectively their actions by invoking the 
standard reasons other people give for doing them, even when they in fact acted under 
some external pressure. In other words, they tend to mistake minimal actions for full-
fledged ones : as we saw above, a minimal action is precisely not defined by its having 
an internal, mental cause. So, whereas minimal actions fall by definition in the realm of 
behaviors that imply a voluntary movement,  they fail to imply the property of being 
voluntary in this deeper sense of having a long-term internal state as their cause.
Let us come back to our former example. Only in the first case ("I  have moved to the 
window because I wanted to see whether my friend had arrived") is the agent acting 
voluntarily, in the sense that she has a specific reason for going to the window. If she 
goes to the window  because she is influenced by a previous hypnosis session,  she is 
certainly not acting voluntarily : she has no reason of her own to make this move;  she 
is furthermore unaware that her doing so satisfies the intention of someone else (the 
hypnotist). This contrast warrants making a B distinction between "acting voluntarily" 
and "acting unvoluntarily". Some people may move voluntarily while acting in an 
involuntary way. They are just caused to act by some external agent or physical 
stimulus. 
We must add an important caveat, however, when it comes to applying this distinction 
to specific cases reported in the first-person mode. Granted that the subject cannot 
introspectively discriminate whether her reason to act is what really moved her to act, it 
may well be that the action was not voluntary after all, in the sense that the agent was 
moved by some contextual cue rather than by her own desire to see her friend. Her 
belief might rationalize her behavior while failing to have caused it.
A further important notion is involved in this contrast ; in case  I go to the window to 
see whether my friend  arrived, things had been different, e.g.  had there been snipers 
around, I would not have moved to the window. In this kind of case, I can change my 
plan flexibly ; in the hypnosis case, or in the command case, I cannot. So the contrast 
between voluntary and involuntary actions might involve in a number of cases a 
distinction between actions whose development (i.e. initiation and monitoring)  is more 
or less automatic and  those whose development  is more or less sensitive to context. 
(The "more-or-less" clause is more plausible than a strict division between two 
categories. I can pace around in the room absent-mindedly, but still adjust to the 
context, and refrain doing so when it would involve unwanted consequences. Still 
automatic drivers often miss the correct freeway exit).
Still the B- way of understanding the contrast between voluntary and involuntary 
actions does not capture an additional, important aspect of voluntariness, having to do 
with the fact that an agent may -- on line or retrospectively --  assent or dissent  to 
performing an action while performing it. A subject may have moved voluntarily, and 
have been caused to move by some long-term disposition of hers (thus acting 
voluntarily in the sense B above), while being unable to resist the force of her drive for 
performing the action. Her action  should then count as C-involuntary. Let us see why.
C - Voluntariness as a second-order property of actions
Let us assume that, even when an agent's behavior is actually controlled by the 
environment, she represents her action as driven by internal motives. Generally 
speaking, an agent may or not, while acting, feel a dissonance between the desire or 
motivation that triggered her action and some higher order desire. This dissonance 
may be more or less intense, according to the kind of action performed (compare : "I 
should not have killed him" with "I should not have smashed the vase"). Such a 
dissonance can be understood as a functional property, independent from the notion 
that the agent would be "free" to act otherwise. This dissonance implies a third level of 
analysis  of a voluntary action.
Let us make sure that the subject matter of free will does not interfere with the 
present debate. Freedom to act as one wishes is an issue sometimes confused with the 
disposition to agree or not with one's first order motivations. What does it mean to say 
that one acts "freely" ? According to the so-called "principle of alternate possibilities", a 
person can act freely only if she could have acted differently from what she did in a 
particular situation. But given the fact that all the physical states are what they are, the 
idea that one  could have acted differently from what one did - or thought differently 
from what one did - is a contentious matter, one which should not be taken for granted 
in naturalistic approaches to action. Indeed Wolfgang Prinz has convincingly shown 
that the notion of free will cannot be incorporated in an empirical psychological theory 
(Prinz, 1997b, cf. Reader vol. II). Let us thus assume in this discussion that every single 
state, mental or physical, is the effect of a set of physical causes such that no other act 
was possible for a given agent in a given context. This assumption has no bearing on 
the distinction between the case where an agent simply acts as she does without 
further ado and the case where she is able to ask herself whether she is right to do 
what she does. This latter capacity, as Harry Frankfurt  (1988) insists, is a purely 
representational capacity ; it is not an executive one : it is independent from the ability 
of the same agent to resist successfully   her first order motives. For example, a drug 
addict craving for heroin may form the second order desire not to desire to take heroin, 
while being unable - now and later on - to resist the desire to take it.
This kind of case allows distinguishing two C-varieties of a less than voluntary action. 
We will examine shortly how this distinction applies to our minimal actions.
a -  Non-voluntary action as an impulsive and irreflexive action.
A first kind of case consists in acting under the influence of internal or external 
causes, without  being able to represent alternatives, as is the case for an impulsive 
and irreflexive action (Frankfurt, 1988). An action is impulsive  when it is performed on 
the basis of some first-order desire, or some current external cue, without any inhibitory 
mechanism being applicable. An action is irreflexive  when the agent is not able to 
entertain second-order desires : she cannot consider alternative courses of actions and 
order them in the light of her preferences, or she "does not care" for the kind of desires 
that guide her actions.  Non-human animals and young children seem to belong to this 
category of impulsive and irreflexive agents : they act on the basis of the stronger will 
activated, without being able to form a concurrent representation of other courses of 
action nor to select among their desires the kinds they would rather promote. An 
impulsive action may thus be perceived as one's own (A-voluntary), and be seen as 
consonant to some desire one has, or as contextually adequate, (B-voluntary), without 
being voluntary in the sense of being considered in the light of some higher-order 
desire (Ca-voluntary). 
It is interesting to observe that an action involuntary in this sense never appears 
involuntary to an irreflexive agent who performs it. By definition, an irreflexive agent 
does not appreciate the fact  that she does not raise the question of her preferences 
concerning her first order motivations.  Only an agent able to represent her first-order 
desires can raise this question, a fact with a high moral and legal relevance.
Many minimal actions are impulsive, and their motives fail by definition to be 
considered. It makes them also involuntary "by definition" in the Ca  sense. But this 
sense of involuntary does not account for an important difference between minimal 
actions. Some are in consonance with the general behavior of the agent, some are'nt. 
Driving absent-mindedly and smashing vases are two very different kinds of minimal 
actions. The following variety of C-non voluntary actions should account for this crucial 
difference.
b-  Non-voluntary action as a motivationally dissonant action
In the preceding case of an impulsive-irreflexive agent,   non-voluntary actions are 
necessarily part of a repertoire of exclusively  Ca- non-voluntary actions : a non-human 
animal can never reach the level of a reflexive agent, because it lacks the relevant set 
of representational-executive abilities. Human minimal actions, on the other hand, 
seem to be part of a larger repertoire of actions having different kinds of causal 
background, and  more or less susceptible of being integrated with the agent's second-
order preferences. Some of the actions of an individual may be performed impulsively, 
some others inhibited or carefully planned. Among those actions which are planned, 
some are planned using only first-order desires (as when one plans to prepare a 
gourmet meal) , some involve a selection between the sets of desires to be made 
efficient (should I rather eat as I wish and get fat, or follow a diet and get slim ?)
In the case of minimal actions, although they are not the product of a conscious 
intention to act, they can differ with respect to the evaluation  which will take place, by 
necessity, after  the deed. An agent may  perform a large variety of minimal actions 
under the control of some external cue or present emotion, while being able to 
reconsider her actions reflexively after she performed them (or at most at the time she 
performs them). In this late reflexive stage, the subject may or may not, in Frankfurt's 
words, "identify to" her first-order motivation. For example she may recognize that 
crashing the China vase out of anger  involved a substantial loss, that losing her self-
control had many unwanted consequences etc., and regret her [minimal] actions. Or 
she may on the contrary find herself doing something which she later  finds useful and 
in agreement with what she should have done (like ducking when a projectile was 
moving towards her, avoiding a car crash in a split second, etc.).
 The important point is that, in all these cases of minimal actions, the agent may have 
acted involuntarily, in the sense (B) that she did not have the intention to act in such a 
way, and find herself either pleased or discontent with what she did. In the latter case, 
her action can be said to be involuntary in the sense (Cb) of being not only under no 
direct control of her desires, but also in complete discrepancy with her second-order 
desires. Intuitively, this contrast is examplified in analogy with the situations of two drug 
addicts described by Frankfurt. It is one thing to take heroin because one desires to 
take heroin and because one thinks that taking heroin is a behavior that one wishes to 
promote ; another thing to take heroin because one cannot refrain from doing so, 
although one desires to stop taking it. In the same way, one can perform a minimal 
action which one can later identify to. Had she had time to think about it, the agent 
would have done just what she did, as she herself explains. Ducking was the thing  to 
do. Although she did not duck voluntarily, there is one sense in which she is pleased 
with was she did, and would do it deliberately had she a chance to find herself in the 
same context.
Now take the vase smasher. Had the agent been given a chance not to smash the 
vase, she would not have smashed it. The agent here dissents from what she did, 
because she dislikes this episode of violence; she does not want to be moved by anger 
to do something. A minimal action of this kind is involuntary in the sense Cb  that the 
agent is made to act against her own preferences.
This third level of analysis of how a minimal action can be seen as voluntary may 
raise the following objection. Why take an action which the agent could not have 
prevented to happen as voluntary on the basis of counterfactual properties, of the type 
"Had I been able to think things over, I would have/would not have done it". Is not this 
kind of consideration too late to call the corresponding action  a voluntary one ? Here is 
the line that an answer to the objection might take.
If one considers the case of a single minimal action, having this third level of analysis 
of voluntariness may indeed appear as a useless sophistication : too late is too late. 
Granted  that actions are reproduced over time, however,  the evaluations which an 
agent produces of her past minimal actions in the light of her second-order desires may 
in the future help her control impulsions of the same type. The second-order desires 
and similar evaluative states   are therefore not idle, even when they arise after the 
action considered ; they have an important role in shaping the future behavior of the 
same agent, helping her to act voluntarily, in sense C,  when circumstances allow it. 
The importance of the evaluation is that, in the future, a minimal action of the same type 
may, through an efficient inhibition, be prevented to happen, or at least, become 
subject to an inhibitory learning process.  Even if one rejects  the folk-psychological 
standard account of the will, there is thus room for an interesting role of voluntary action 
in the evaluative sense of the term to characterize a behavior that is shaped over time 
by second-order desires.  
References 
Armstrong, D.M. (1991). Intentionality, perception and causality : Reflections on John Searle's 
Intentionality, in E. LePore & R. Van Gulick (Eds.), John Searle and his Critics, Cambridge: Blackwell, 
149-158.
Bach, K.. (1978). A representational theory of action,  Philosophical Studies,  34,  361-379.
Bratman, M.E., (1987), Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Daprati, E., Franck, N., Georgieff, N., Proust, J., Pacherie, E., Dalery, J. & Jeannerod, M. (1998). 
Looking for the agent, an investigation into self-consciousness and consciousness of the action in 
schizophrenic patients, Cognition, 65, 71- 86.
Davidson, D. (1980). Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Decety, J., Jeannerod, M., & Prablanc, C. (1989). The timing of mentally represented actions. 
Behavioural Brain Research, 34, 35-42.
Fourneret, P. & Jeannerod, M. (1998).  Limited Conscious monitoring of motor performance in 
normal subjects. Neuropsychologia,  36, 11, 1133-1140.
Frankfurt, H. (1988). The importance of what we care about.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Goldman, A. (1970). A theory of human action.  New York:  Prentice Hall.
Goodale, M.A., Pélisson, D.  & Prablanc, C. (1986). Large adjustments in visually guided reaching do 
not depend on vision of the hand or perception of target displacement.  Nature,  320, 748-750.
Hursthouse, R. (1991). Arational actions. Journal of Philosophy, 88, 2, 57-68.
Jeannerod, M., & Fourneret, P. ( 1998). "Etre agent ou être agi? Sur les critères d'auto-attribution 
d'une action". In H. Grivois & J. Proust (Eds.), Subjectivité et conscience d'agir, approches clinique et 
cognitive de la psychose. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,  75-97.
Jeannerod, M. (1994). The representing brain, neural correlates of motor intention and imagery. 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences,  17, 187-245.
Jeannerod, M. (1997). The cognitive neuroscience of action. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lhermitte, F., Pillon, B., Serdaru, M. (1986).  Human autonomy and the frontal lobes. Part I: Imitation 
and Utilization Behavior. Annals of Neurology, 19, 4, 326-334.
Libet, B. (1985). Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action. 
Behavioral Brain Science, 6, 529-566.
Mele, A. R. (1992).  Springs of Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nisbett, R.E. & Wilson, T.D. (1977). Telling more than we can know : verbal reports on mental 
processes. Psychological Review,   84, 3, 1977, 231-259.
Prinz, W. (1987). Ideo-motor action. In H. Heuer & A.F. Sanders (Eds.), Perspectives on Perception 
and Action, Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 47- 76.
Prinz, W. (1990). A common coding approach to Perception and Action. In O. Neumann & W. Prinz 
(Eds.), Relationships between Perception and Action.  Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 167-201.
Prinz, W. (1997a). Perception and Action planning, European Journal of Cognitive psychology, 9,2, 
129-154.
Prinz, W. (1997b). Explaining voluntary action : the role of mental content. In M. Carrier & P.K. 
Machamer, (Eds.), Mindscapes, Philosophy, Science and the Mind.  Konstanz : Universitätsverlag, 
Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 153-175.
 Proust, J. (1996). Identité personnelle et pathologie de l'action. In  I. Joseph & J. Proust (Eds.), La 
Folie dans la Place,  Pathologies de l'interaction,  Raisons Pratiques,  7, 155-176.
Proust, J. (1997). Comment l'esprit vient aux bêtes.  Paris : Gallimard.
Proust, J. (1999a).  Indexes for action. In Revue Internationale de Philosophie, Neurosciences, 3, 
321-345.
Proust, J.,  (1999b). Experience, action and theory of mind. In Developmental  Science,  2, 3, 
286-287.
Proust, J. (2000). Awareness of Agency : Three Levels of Analysis. In T. Metzinger (Ed.), The Neural 
Correlates of Consciousness, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Proust, J. (to appear1).  Imitation et agentivité. In J. Nadel & J. Decety  (Eds.), Imitation, 
représentations motrices et intentionnalité, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Proust, J.  (to appear2).  Perceiving intentions. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-
awareness: issues in philosophy and psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenblueth, A., Wiener, N. & Bigelow J. (1943). Behavior, Purpose and teleology.  Philosophy of 
Science, 10, 18-24. 
Roth, J., Prinz, W. & Maasen, S.. (2000).Voluntary action, A Reader.  Texts collected to prepare the 
Conference on Voluntary Action, Delmenhorst, Germany.
Searle, J.R. (1983). Intentionality, an Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Searle, J.R. (1991). Reference and intentionality. In E. LePore & R. Van Gulick (Eds.), John Searle and 
his Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 227-241.
Sommerhoff, G. (1990). Life, Brain and Consciousness, New Perceptions through Targeted Systems 
Analysis, North Holland, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Sperry, R.W. (1950). Neural basis of the spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual 
inversion. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 43, 482-489. 
Von Holst, E., & Mittelstaedt, H. (1950). Das Reafferenzprinzip, Wechselwirkungen zwischen 
Zentralnervensystem und Peripherie.Naturwissenschaften, 37, 464-476.
  
